Saturday, June 02, 2007

 

Naturalistic Religion


There is a rather extended exchange in Christianity Today between Christopher Hitchens, author of God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything, bon vivant journalist and someone who may be vying for the title of Dawkins' Bulldog as far as atheism goes, on one side, and Douglas Wilson, author of Letter from a Christian Citizen, a theologian at New Saint Andrews College, and minister at Christ Church in Moscow, Idaho, on the other. Their subject was: "Is Christianity Good for the World?" The final section, with links to all the previous ones, can be found here.

It is an interesting debate, especially given the recent attention demanded and received by the so-called neo-atheists, among whom Hitchens has rapidly become prominent, since there have been few where actual dialogue has broken out. While neither side "won" in my opinion (hardly surprising, given my agnosticism and my view that neither side can win), I do think Wilson came off slightly better, though that might be mostly due to the fact, as the "home team," he got to go last. The most interesting issue raised was at the end. Wilson harped on what the source of morality was for atheists. After some little circling around the issue, Hitchens stated (Part 6):

Our morality evolved. Just as we have. Natural selection and trial-and-error have given us the vague yet grand conception of human rights and some but not yet all of the means of making these rights coherent and consistent.
But then Wilson asks in response:

Are you filled with fierce indignation that the koala bear hasn't evolved ears that stick flat to the side of his head like they are supposed to? Are you wroth over the fact that clams don't have legs yet? When you notice that the bears at the zoo continue to suck on their paws, do you stop to remonstrate with them?

Your notion of morality, and the evolution it rode in on, can only concern itself with what is. But morality as Christians understand it, and the kind you surreptitiously draw upon, is concerned with ought. David Hume showed us that we cannot successfully derive ought from is.
Note that this is not the crude "without god there can be no morality" claim that neo-atheists have so much fun puncturing. Wilson has neatly turned around the "Darwinist" response to theist complaints about the cruelty of natural selection or claims that evolutionary theory had a role in subsequent horrors like the Holocaust. One common response to such claims is to point out that inferring a moral judgment from a fact of nature is to commit what is commonly (but perhaps erroneously) called "the naturalistic fallacy." In other words, on a naturalistic account of the origin of morality, thinking of anything as immoral is to confuse "is" with "ought."

Since Hitchens called the teachings of Christianity immoral and evil (and he is hardly alone among neo-atheists in that regard), I'd go one step further. Steven Pinker, in his essay "Evolution and Ethics" in Intelligent Thought: Science versus the Intelligent Design Movement (2006), after suggesting the origins of morality in empathy for close kin and cooperative behavior as justified by game theory, goes on to describe our "moral sense" as:

... a suite of moral emotions. Sympathy and trust prompt people to extend the first favor. Gratitude and loyalty prompt them to repay favors. Guilt and shame deter them from hurting or failing to repay others. Anger and contempt prompt them to avoid or punish cheaters. And among humans, any tendency of an individual to reciprocate or cheat does not have to be witnessed firsthand but can be recounted by language. This leads to an interest in the moral reputation of others, transmitted by gossip and public approval or condemnation, and a concern with the moral esteem in which one is held by others.
Now it seems clear to me that religion serves as a means of generating initial trust, a reason to get together and share such gossip and as a mechanism to enforce guilt and shame and reward the socially cooperative. Furthermore, there has been some evidence that the notion of an invisible but omnipresent god may serve to extend the watchfulness of ones neighbors to situations where the individual is alone and may be tempted to cheat.

Even if the religious impulse is not a direct evolutionary adaptation itself, religion is, on an evolutionary account of morality, almost certainly a culturally evolved mechanism expressing and enforcing such adaptations. If so, condemning the morality of religion would also appear to be an instance of is/ought confusion.

I think there may well be ways around these objections but I'd be interested in the reaction of any atheists, since Hitchens did not get a chance to reply.
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Comments:
"religion is, on an evolutionary account of morality, almost certainly a culturally evolved mechanism expressing and enforcing such adaptations. If so, condemning the morality of religion would also appear to be an instance of is/ought confusion."

Not necessarily.

Religion is. It's one of the aspects of our environment. That can be accepted.

We may go on from there and say "We don't like the results," (and that's all "evil" is, really; something we perceive as hurtful); that is another aspect of our environment.

And we have several choices, faced with this; we can, for example, just accept it as a given, the way we accept the fact that the ocean sometimes has storms. Or we can try to change the environment, in this case by reducing or eliminating the hurtful claims of religion, working to change its view of "morality". As has been done in the past, causing the switch from espousal to condemnation of slavery, for example.

That is not an is/ought confusion, any more than rooting out dandelions in your yard is an is/ought confusion.
 
Religion is. It's one of the aspects of our environment. That can be accepted.

Well, it was no accident that I pointed to an evolutionary psychologist like Pinker. The problem will be bigger the more of an adaptionist you are. But it is hard to see how anyone can blithely credit evolution for our moral sense (in order to counter the argument of people like Francis Collins that it is evidence for design), and then turn around and deny that religion is also a result of evolution. What possible evidence could you use to separate them in any evolutionary account? Are you going to say human morality "just is"? Why isn't it an agrument then for a morality-giver? Even if, say, you argued it was one of Gould's spandrels hitchhiking on our need for morality, it would still be a fact of nature without real moral import.

We may go on from there and say "We don't like the results," (and that's all "evil" is, really; something we perceive as hurtful); that is another aspect of our environment.

Except, on that formulation, given that it is probably the case that far more people don't like the results of evolutionary biology than don't like the results of religion, we'd have to say evolutionary biology is "evil" and religion isn't. In other words, there is a little problem with that "we." On the other hand, if everyone is allowed to have their own private morality, how could "we" say that murder is wrong?

Or we can try to change the environment, in this case by reducing or eliminating the hurtful claims of religion, working to change its view of "morality". ... That is not an is/ought confusion, any more than rooting out dandelions in your yard is an is/ought confusion..

Or the theists can simply try to root out heretics like you'd root out dandelions. And since neither the dandelions nor the heretics believe that there is any such thing as morality, what appeal could they make to the majority?

I still think there is a solution to the argument but it is not quite that simple.
 
I'm of the opinion that "morality" arguments between theists and atheists are non-starters to begin with. Namely, atheists have nothing to respond to when a Christian asks "what is the basis for your morality?" Moral thinking isn't something that has a "basis", it's a fuzzy categorization we bestow on a variety of feelings and intuitions we have about out treatment toward others. "Reasoning" morality is sort of like "reasoning" what kind of music you like.

And theists don't have much of a retort in that case, because the case for theistic morality is incoherent IMO. It's very much an "if X, then Y" proposition. It's problematic because, even if we assume the consequent follows from the antecedent, you have to demonstrate the antecedent. If one can't demonstrate that god is real, much less that god has provided a reliable communication for his moral dictates, then the case for theistic morality is not better than "My friend betsy says you shouldn't do X, and she's always right".

Then there is always the fact that, even given the assumption that one can reliably derive morality from ancient religious texts, the theist still has to explain away the dictates in the books they don't adhere to because they find appalling. Christians don't execute homosexuals and adulterers (among others), despite clear Biblical commands to do so. What they do is pick and choose with the aid of the feelings and intuitions I mentioned earlier. One could even conjecture that such an approach is more prone to vestigial moral thinking, which causes people to overvalue things like traditional gender roles and racial stratification, all of which found ample expression in the religious elements of our society.
 
"But it is hard to see how anyone can blithely credit evolution for our moral sense (in order to counter the argument of people like Francis Collins that it is evidence for design), and then turn around and deny that religion is also a result of evolution."

I find that hard to see, too. Religion is just as much a part of our makeup as morality, and probably developed along the same lines. As you imply, it possibly has some positive value in promoting group cohesion.

"Are you going to say human morality "just is"?"

Most humans have a moral sense. That is the way things are. If that is what you mean by "just is".

"Why isn't it an agrument then for a morality-giver?"

Why would it be?

"On the other hand, if everyone is allowed to have their own private morality, how could "we" say that murder is wrong?"

Everyone does have their own private morality, which only vaguely coincides with that of their peers.

And "we", stating the opinion of the majority of people, say that we disapprove of murder. (However we, at the moment, are defining "murder".) Or we can say, "I,personally, think murder is wrong." This still has nothing to do with a "morality giver".

And we can say, "I (or we) think that your religious morality is wrong and harmful;" not an "ought", but an "is".

"Or the theists can simply try to root out heretics like you'd root out dandelions."

Look around; that's what quite a few of them are trying to do.

"And since neither the dandelions nor the heretics believe that there is any such thing as morality, what appeal could they make to the majority?"

But the heretics do believe there is morality; they just don't believe it is given from On High, but rather that it arises out of our evolutionary background. And, like it or not, it is an individual and changeable valuation; "oughts" just don't fit.

"I still think there is a solution to the argument but it is not quite that simple."

It never is.
 
Tyler wrote:
"Moral thinking isn't something that has a "basis", it's a fuzzy categorization we bestow on a variety of feelings and intuitions we have about out treatment toward others."

Dead on.
 
John Pieret says,

Even if the religious impulse is not a direct evolutionary adaptation itself, religion is, on an evolutionary account of morality, almost certainly a culturally evolved mechanism expressing and enforcing such adaptations. If so, condemning the morality of religion would also appear to be an instance of is/ought confusion.

I agree with this. Religion is a culturally derived mechanism of coping. I don't condemn the morality of religion because I recognize that morality is relative. What I resist are those people who: (a) want to impose their version of morality on me and/or (b) insist that morality must come from God.

Now, don't get me wrong about this. I certainly don't refrain from trying to impose my morality on others. There are aspects of other people's morality that I would very much like to change. For example, I don't think it's right to stone to death a 17 year old girl who is accused of dating outside of her tribe.

Where I might differ from some other atheists is that I don't think that the desire to murder young girls is in your genes and can't be changed.

Religion is not the product of biological evolution in any meaningful sense of the term "biological evolution." In order for that statement to be true there would have to be specific genes for religious behavior, as opposed to atheist behavior.

I think there may well be ways around these objections but I'd be interested in the reaction of any atheists, since Hitchens did not get a chance to reply.

I'm not exactly sure what "objections" you are trying to gt around. Did my rely help?
 
Moral thinking isn't something that has a "basis", it's a fuzzy categorization we bestow on a variety of feelings and intuitions we have about out treatment toward others. "Reasoning" morality is sort of like "reasoning" what kind of music you like.

So there was nothing objectively evil about the Holocaust? It falls within the same mental category as a kid swiping a penny candy from a store and there is no way for me to reason any differently?

As you guys should know by now, I'm not really interested in whether theists have a better answer for the problem than atheists. The real issue is that we all -- theist, atheist, agnostic, whatever -- go around acting as if there is at least some objective moral evils.

But when theists claim that the moral sense is unique to human beings and is, therefore, an argument for design, a response that posits only a highly subjective and fluid moral sense does not seem to adequately explain actual human behavior. That was Wilson's real point.

We make fun of theists for saying, in effect, that without their god, they'd be out in the streets with an uzi shooting down random people. I'm not sure we are any more convincing if we say that, except for our "fuzzy categories," we'd be out there with them.

As far as saying that religion and morality are just part of our nature, then there is no reason to believe that religion can be overcome by reason, anymore than the tendency of the appendix to become infected can be overcome by reason, and Dawkins' and Harris' and Hitchens' books are a colossal waste of time. If religion is just the result of our evolutionary history, then like any frequency dependent evolutionary trait, some people will believe, some won't and there will be some in between and, at most, you can get people to adopt other labels without really changing their inherent and inherited beliefs or actions. And, once again, if that is true, there is no way to condemn religion or the actions of people practicing it, any more than you can condemn appendixes or people whose appendix bursts.
 
Larry:

I missed seeing your reply there for a bit but ...

I'm not exactly sure what "objections" you are trying to gt around. Did my rely help?

The objections are: if what we call "morality" (and, possibly, religion), are "facts of nature" does that mean, therefore, that they are no more subject themselves to moral judgment than natural selection is?

Your answer certainly moves religion further away from being an evolutionary adaptation. But is that enough to move it out of the category of a "fact of nature"?

I agree that it isn't right to stone to death a 17 year old girl (though I can't imagine why her dating practices are, in any way, relevant). The question is whether there is any reason other than my personal preference involved.
 
"So there was nothing objectively evil about the Holocaust?"

Nothing "objectively evil", though I would say that it violates our intersubjective notions of right and wrong. The Holocaust objectively caused enormous suffering, death and destruction. We understand these things as wrong because of our moral feelings and intuition. Something doesn't have to fulfill some metaphysical, Platonic concept of "evil" for us to condemn it.

"As far as saying that religion and morality are just part of our nature, then there is no reason to believe that religion can be overcome by reason, anymore than the tendency of the appendix to become infected can be overcome by reason, and Dawkins' and Harris' and Hitchens' books are a colossal waste of time."

I think you're invoking the fallacy of the excluded middle here. While atheists can understand that religion is likely at the very least a byproduct of innate cognitive propensities, that doesn't mean we have to surrender to fatalism. Something being "natural" doesn't necessarily imply that it's completely immutable. As we already know from experience in the Western world, religion's excesses can be tamed. It requires a variety of approaches, however, which include the hardline rationalist perspective.
 
But, Tyler, you're denying that there is a hardline rationalist perspective on morality. According to you it's all fuzzy feelings and unquantifiable intuition ...

Okay, here is my provisional solution:

You were, I think, on the right track with the idea of the excluded middle, except that what is excluded is the fact that humans have numerous abilities besides the moral sense that can be brought to bear on any problem. The fact that each such attribute may be evolved for a particular problem does not mean they can't be used on others. We default to a base ten mathematics because we happened to evolve 10 fingers/toes but that doesn't stop us from reasoning our way to binary and hexadecimal systems.

We can, in similar fashion, reason our way to certain conclusions that, while they may not qualify as totally "objective" are more than mere individual preference. Abusing and killing children is especially wrong not just because it is evolutionarily counter-productive but because we can reason that they are particularily vunerable and, therefore, unfair targets of such acts. Genocide is wrong not just because of some indefinite difference in scale but because it is both a group crime (making it more dangerous to everyone) and indiscriminate in its targets, again, often going after the weak.

Our morality then, is not constrained by our evolved moral sense but only informed by it. We may well be nothing more than the sum total of various "facts of nature" that go to make us up (that is, after all, the argument between theists and atheists) but even if we are, we have both the ability and understanding to sufficiently mix and match those abilities to result in answers that are not mere "output" of the adaptive trait.

Exercising that ability and understanding means we are beyond mere "is" and into the realm of "ought."
 
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