Tuesday, September 08, 2009
Burned By Chestnuts
I do wish Jerry Coyne would stick to biology, at which he is great, and leave philosophy, at which he is, to say the least, not great, alone. At a minimum, he could refrain from sneering at that which he does not understand.Coyne's latest stab (in all senses of the word) at philosophy is in response to an article at The Daily Dish by Jim Manzi entitled "In Defense of Robert Wright against Jerry Coyne." I'm not particularly interested in Manzi's argument (which he has further defended here, and here) but in Coyne's response to it. Coyne starts off with this:
There could, of course, be a divine plan that happens to coincide with The Big Bang, evolution, and all the materialistic processes we study, and we wouldn't be able to disprove that. Deistic evolution, in which a god starts everything off and then retires, could be a divine plan, though of course it's not the sort of divine plan that many religious people would accept.
So far, so good. That's is, I think, a correct description of the philosophical limits of science ... as far as it goes. But deism of a sort intended by Coyne is not exhaustive of the possible ways a god with sufficient abilities could operate to achieve a plan. And Coyne knows that, since he has, himself, addressed other potential ways a god could influence the world without being detectable by science. In particular, he took notice of Francis Collins' suggestion (also advanced by Ken Miller) of the logical possibility that such a god could act in the realm of quantum uncertainty.
Coyne continues:
Coyne continues:
All that science can do on this front is to seek evidence for a divine plan of a certain type, and either support or falsify that plan. Some divine plans — for example, those that preclude innocent people or animals from needless suffering — have already been ruled out by science. Science has also dismissed any divine plan that involves an omnipotent and omnibenevolent god. Science and reason, then, can have things to say about Divine Plans.
There are, of course, a lot of assumptions hidden in that "needless." This in nothing but a slight variation on "the argument from evil." As I've already addressed once before, this argument suffers from the problem of how to define "evil," keeping in mind that Coyne, himself, for purposes of the argument, is granting the potential existence of an omniscient being who may be looking at the life we know as the infinitesimally short prelude to an eternal life he/she/it is granting to human beings. In such a case, what counts as "suffering" and "evil" is very much up for grabs, a point that the "traditional religions" (that Coyne and other atheists love to fall back on when faced by more sophisticated theologians) readily acknowledge in such formulations as "the ways of God are mysterious." Still, if people sophisticated in the ways of philosophy such as Colin McGinn and Jonathan Miller can trot out the argument from evil for purposes of a television show (knowing full well, I suspect, that it isn't as simple as that), I can hardly fault Coyne for doing the same for a blog post.
But Coyne takes it a step further and states that science has "dismissed any divine plan that involves an omnipotent and omnibenevolent god." At the very least this is horribly confused. The argument from evil is ancient, going back at least to Epicurus, and, while the Greeks of Epicurus' time could be said to have had science, it wasn't science that he appealed to for an understanding of what "evil" is. In fact, science adds nothing to that question even to this day.
However, Coyne really hits his philosophical know-nothingism stride with his response to Manzi's invocation of the "first cause" argument:
But Coyne takes it a step further and states that science has "dismissed any divine plan that involves an omnipotent and omnibenevolent god." At the very least this is horribly confused. The argument from evil is ancient, going back at least to Epicurus, and, while the Greeks of Epicurus' time could be said to have had science, it wasn't science that he appealed to for an understanding of what "evil" is. In fact, science adds nothing to that question even to this day.
However, Coyne really hits his philosophical know-nothingism stride with his response to Manzi's invocation of the "first cause" argument:
Oh dear. This chestnut is so old that it's fossilized. And the answer to this claim hasn't changed for decades: why is God any more an "uncaused cause" than is the universe, or the "physical laws" themselves? God is always called the "uncaused cause" without further explanation, but that simply won't do. If He was an uncaused cause, what did He do before creating everything? Hang around twiddling His thumbs?
To grab the low hanging fruit first, does Coyne really think his juvenile taunt about God twiddling his thumbs adds anything to the discussion of a philosophical problem that has engaged the greatest minds since the time of Plato and Aristotle? Even if he does, here is an instance where science at least suggests a response that Coyne himself has appealed to (quoting Sean Carroll with approval) in countering the claim that the "multiverse" is a desperation move by scientists in response to the "fine tuning" of physical constants favorable to the existence of life:
[V]arious theoretical attempts to explain phenomena that we directly observe right in front of us — like gravity, and quantum field theory — lead us to predict that our universe should be one of many, and subsequently suggest that we take that situation [the existence of the multiverse] seriously when we talk about the "naturalness" of various features of our local environment.
But, if the multiverse is real, then God may have been creating and tending to an infinite number of universes all throughout eternity, instead of twiddling his thumbs. Not much of an argument, I grant, but fully commensurate to Coyne's. Furthermore, Coyne's "argument" is indicative of his inability to form a consistent philosophy that integrates his own knowledge across the various arguments he makes.
The more substantial problem with Coyne's reaction to this 'fossilized chestnut' is that he has the first cause argument exactly backwards. It is not that "God" is inherently superior to an eternal universe as a candidate for the "unmoved mover," it is that whatever unmoved mover there might be breaks the cause --> effect relationship that is at the heart of what we call "natural." Whichever you choose, you are calling into question naturalism, both methodological and metaphysical. No less an atheist light as E.O. Wilson has acknowledged, in his On Human Knowledge, that the question "why is there something instead of nothing" is a difficult one for atheists. And, if the world, at the most fundamental level of its very existence, is not the result of cause preceding effect, how can we be sure it holds anywhere in science? The importance of cause preceding effect to our scientific understanding is well explained in a post by Dr. Steven Novella (discussing how we can know that the brain causes "mind"):
The more substantial problem with Coyne's reaction to this 'fossilized chestnut' is that he has the first cause argument exactly backwards. It is not that "God" is inherently superior to an eternal universe as a candidate for the "unmoved mover," it is that whatever unmoved mover there might be breaks the cause --> effect relationship that is at the heart of what we call "natural." Whichever you choose, you are calling into question naturalism, both methodological and metaphysical. No less an atheist light as E.O. Wilson has acknowledged, in his On Human Knowledge, that the question "why is there something instead of nothing" is a difficult one for atheists. And, if the world, at the most fundamental level of its very existence, is not the result of cause preceding effect, how can we be sure it holds anywhere in science? The importance of cause preceding effect to our scientific understanding is well explained in a post by Dr. Steven Novella (discussing how we can know that the brain causes "mind"):
[O]ne of the primary arguments used by dualists is the notion that brain activity only correlates with mental activity – and since correlation alone does not prove causation, it is possible that the mind causes brain activity, or that some third thing causes both. Logically speaking, this is true. These are always the options to explain a correlation between A and B: A causes B, B causes A, or C causes A and B. ...
It is a well established tenet of science and philosophy that causes precede their effects. An effect cannot occur prior to a cause. If someone gets lung cancer before they start smoking, no reasonable person would attempt to blame the cancer on the smoking. Therefore, if brain activity causes the mind then we would expect that brain activity would generally begin prior to the mental effects caused by the brain activity. If, rather, the mind causes the corresponding brain activity then we would expect a mental experience to happen before the brain activity. If some third phenomenon causes both mental activity and the corresponding brain function, then we would expect both to occur simultaneously, although either could precede the other if there were differing lag times for the mind and the brain.
In effect, Coyne's response to the first cause argument is to deny that, as far as the material world is concerned, cause necessarily precedes effect, which, in turn, calls into question the ability of science to deliver "truth." And given that science is, itself, the best argument for naturalism, calling the cause/effect relationship into question is a self-defeating proposition. And if naturalism fails as an explanation of the fundamental question of why something rather than nothing exists, what is the alternative? What is the proper word to describe an uncaused cause?
Of course, the first cause argument does not, in and of itself, go to the existence of a personal god. But, as Dawkins argues in The God Delusion, even if you can't prove something in one go, it is legitimate to make arguments that increase the "probability" of one explanation over another.
There may be some cogent reply to the first cause argument, though I've seen none that is compelling. But blithely dismissing it with unfounded arrogance as an 'old chestnut,' while advancing an argument that raises as many problems as it solves, is as grating as any creationist bafflegab.
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Of course, the first cause argument does not, in and of itself, go to the existence of a personal god. But, as Dawkins argues in The God Delusion, even if you can't prove something in one go, it is legitimate to make arguments that increase the "probability" of one explanation over another.
There may be some cogent reply to the first cause argument, though I've seen none that is compelling. But blithely dismissing it with unfounded arrogance as an 'old chestnut,' while advancing an argument that raises as many problems as it solves, is as grating as any creationist bafflegab.
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Comments:
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Thanks for the thoughtful comments. I've replied to Professor Coyne, and make several of the same points at The Daily Dish.
Best regards,
Jim Manzi
Best regards,
Jim Manzi
# posted by 
: 12:15 AM
: 12:15 AM
No less an atheist light as E.O. Wilson has acknowledged, in his On Human Knowledge, that the question "why is there something instead of nothing" is a difficult one for atheists.
To which the answer "because God wished it so" is a cop out of the first order.
To which the answer "because God wished it so" is a cop out of the first order.
To which the answer "because God wished it so" is a cop out of the first order.
Of course. But so is "because the universe just is."
Of course. But so is "because the universe just is."
Thony,
Without going so far as to endorse a theistic answer myself, I have to say I don't find it a cop-out, specifically. If causation is real, and really inviolable, as it seems to be, then explaining the origin of causation is going to require something that seems god-like, something bigger than, but not in opposition to, all the known rules. The reason Aristotle surmised a First Cause was to buttress the reality and validity of reason, against the crisis of infinite regress.
The alternative (to an unmoved mover) is that reason is all in our minds; that we project it onto a meaningless and lawless cosmos. Seeing that Coyne's last post is against Eugenie Scott's statement that there are "ways of knowing" besides science, it seems unlikely he would embrace this view. His confrere Dawkins goes so far to call "leftist relativism" even more of a threat to science than religion is. I think neither man has come to full grips with the death of God just yet.
Without going so far as to endorse a theistic answer myself, I have to say I don't find it a cop-out, specifically. If causation is real, and really inviolable, as it seems to be, then explaining the origin of causation is going to require something that seems god-like, something bigger than, but not in opposition to, all the known rules. The reason Aristotle surmised a First Cause was to buttress the reality and validity of reason, against the crisis of infinite regress.
The alternative (to an unmoved mover) is that reason is all in our minds; that we project it onto a meaningless and lawless cosmos. Seeing that Coyne's last post is against Eugenie Scott's statement that there are "ways of knowing" besides science, it seems unlikely he would embrace this view. His confrere Dawkins goes so far to call "leftist relativism" even more of a threat to science than religion is. I think neither man has come to full grips with the death of God just yet.
We are aware of many effects without causes, all quantum. As the early universe was not macroscopic it seems rather silly to insist that it had a cause, or even a source.
The effort to reify, deify and anthropomorphize a putative first cause seems a colossal waste of time until you've got some evidence to support your theological/philosophical musings.
"Why is there something?" is a terrible question...it assumes an actor with a purpose (begging the question, eh?). "How did the thing we exist in come about?" is much better as it attempts to keep the answer within the realm of science rather than theology/philosophy.
Of course, the answer is: "We don't know. But we're working on it and we've got these ideas we'd like to test." And that, even with its lack of content, is so much more satisfying than "First cause dunnit", no matter how prettily you dress that up in the finery and trappings of theological and philosophical utterances.
--
Martin
The effort to reify, deify and anthropomorphize a putative first cause seems a colossal waste of time until you've got some evidence to support your theological/philosophical musings.
"Why is there something?" is a terrible question...it assumes an actor with a purpose (begging the question, eh?). "How did the thing we exist in come about?" is much better as it attempts to keep the answer within the realm of science rather than theology/philosophy.
Of course, the answer is: "We don't know. But we're working on it and we've got these ideas we'd like to test." And that, even with its lack of content, is so much more satisfying than "First cause dunnit", no matter how prettily you dress that up in the finery and trappings of theological and philosophical utterances.
--
Martin
# posted by : 1:54 PM
: 1:54 PM
We are aware of many effects without causes ...
Are we aware they are without causes (if so how?) or are we just unaware of any cause? And wasn't sting theory an attempt to establish causes for quantum effects?
"Why is there something?" is a terrible question...it assumes an actor with a purpose (begging the question, eh?).
It doesn't assume anything other than that the universe seems to work by cause and effect. It need not be an "actor" in the sense of any "person," but the question remains that an uncaused cause goes against our experience. Worse, if uncaused causes exist, how can we be sure any causal relationship we think we have discovered (the very heart of scientific discovery) is real, instead of just a correlation?
"How did the thing we exist in come about?" is much better as it attempts to keep the answer within the realm of science rather than theology/philosophy.
By all means, keep trying to find out but, until you do, dismissing the the problem as an "old chestnut" is not only factually wrong (it is still very much a live question) but arrogant know-nothingism.
Of course, the answer is: "We don't know. But we're working on it and we've got these ideas we'd like to test."
Okay, I'd understand that answer and you are free (though, in my opinion, foolish) to dismiss philosophy out of hand. But that wasn't the answer Coyne gave. He entered the realm of philosophy ... and did it badly ... which was my point.
What is more, if you take that route, you'd have to (if you're at all interested in intellectual consistency) avoid any claims that science answers questions about gods (such as whether or not there is an omnipotent and omnibenevolent god) since we don't know about those things any more than we know about what caused something to exist rather than nothing.
Are we aware they are without causes (if so how?) or are we just unaware of any cause? And wasn't sting theory an attempt to establish causes for quantum effects?
"Why is there something?" is a terrible question...it assumes an actor with a purpose (begging the question, eh?).
It doesn't assume anything other than that the universe seems to work by cause and effect. It need not be an "actor" in the sense of any "person," but the question remains that an uncaused cause goes against our experience. Worse, if uncaused causes exist, how can we be sure any causal relationship we think we have discovered (the very heart of scientific discovery) is real, instead of just a correlation?
"How did the thing we exist in come about?" is much better as it attempts to keep the answer within the realm of science rather than theology/philosophy.
By all means, keep trying to find out but, until you do, dismissing the the problem as an "old chestnut" is not only factually wrong (it is still very much a live question) but arrogant know-nothingism.
Of course, the answer is: "We don't know. But we're working on it and we've got these ideas we'd like to test."
Okay, I'd understand that answer and you are free (though, in my opinion, foolish) to dismiss philosophy out of hand. But that wasn't the answer Coyne gave. He entered the realm of philosophy ... and did it badly ... which was my point.
What is more, if you take that route, you'd have to (if you're at all interested in intellectual consistency) avoid any claims that science answers questions about gods (such as whether or not there is an omnipotent and omnibenevolent god) since we don't know about those things any more than we know about what caused something to exist rather than nothing.
P.S. Coyne doesn't think we know that there are indeterminant quantum effects:
[Q]uantum mechanics and its indeterminacy are provisional scientific theories; we might eventually find out that what appear to be totally unpredictable events really do have a deterministic causation.
Of course, he was arguing against theistic evolutionists' suggestion of quantum effects as a possible area where gods could act without being detected and, given his penchant for inconsistency in his philosophical arguments, he might change his tune if he wanted to support your answer to the problem.
[Q]uantum mechanics and its indeterminacy are provisional scientific theories; we might eventually find out that what appear to be totally unpredictable events really do have a deterministic causation.
Of course, he was arguing against theistic evolutionists' suggestion of quantum effects as a possible area where gods could act without being detected and, given his penchant for inconsistency in his philosophical arguments, he might change his tune if he wanted to support your answer to the problem.
I'm curious to know what were the watershed experiments that established scientifically that there is no divine plan that precludes needless suffering of the innocent, or that involves an omnipotent or benevolent god. It's interesting that Coyne and others of his mindset like to take a cautious, quasi-positivistic stance on truth claims when defending science, generally, as a humble art, but can't resist wildly overstating science's omnicompetence in the philosophical arena, as here. What does Coyne think science is, such that it can "rule out" needless suffering from a divine perspective? It's the argumentum ad Goldilocks. This porridge is too hot; therefore no god.
MartinDH: "We are aware of many effects without causes"
The word "effect" implies a cause. One can certainly have uncaused phenomena, even uncaused causes, but an "uncaused effect" is an oxymoron.
The word "effect" implies a cause. One can certainly have uncaused phenomena, even uncaused causes, but an "uncaused effect" is an oxymoron.
Very good post John - you covered quite a few bases.
"Why is there something rather than nothing" is also called the Primordial Existential Question (PEQ). It definitely reflects an anthropomorphic perspective, as per MartinDH, but one of the better, if unsatisfying, anthropomorphic answers I've seen is that for "nothing to exist" is a logical contradiction ;)
Cause and effect is a very deep subject in philosophy - just look it up any philosophy wiki or encyclopedia. Just because some event is 100% correlated or happens before another event, doesn't mean it is a cause. For example, if block time were the correct view of time, nothing would be caused - events would just "be". Personally, I like the anthropomorphic view - effects are real, but cause is a human attribution where we anthropomorphize a sequence of events, perhaps because since childhood, we've observed that we can "cause" things to happen via our "free will". But from a scientific standpoint, all we really know is that the universe surrounding us is a correlated dance, where we really can't say anything about ultimate causes. We reduce things as far as we can, but that only gives us a more detailed description of what exists. It doesn't give us any insight into ultimate causes, or why things are the way they are. At the bottom of the reductive heap, we're still stuck with correlated events, just like we were at the macroscopic level. The why question is not really a scientific one. So I would suggest that, if we really don't understand causation in the first place, we shouldn't be using it in fundamental questions about the origin or the universe, or God, or the multiverse, or the nature of everything.
"Why is there something rather than nothing" is also called the Primordial Existential Question (PEQ). It definitely reflects an anthropomorphic perspective, as per MartinDH, but one of the better, if unsatisfying, anthropomorphic answers I've seen is that for "nothing to exist" is a logical contradiction ;)
Cause and effect is a very deep subject in philosophy - just look it up any philosophy wiki or encyclopedia. Just because some event is 100% correlated or happens before another event, doesn't mean it is a cause. For example, if block time were the correct view of time, nothing would be caused - events would just "be". Personally, I like the anthropomorphic view - effects are real, but cause is a human attribution where we anthropomorphize a sequence of events, perhaps because since childhood, we've observed that we can "cause" things to happen via our "free will". But from a scientific standpoint, all we really know is that the universe surrounding us is a correlated dance, where we really can't say anything about ultimate causes. We reduce things as far as we can, but that only gives us a more detailed description of what exists. It doesn't give us any insight into ultimate causes, or why things are the way they are. At the bottom of the reductive heap, we're still stuck with correlated events, just like we were at the macroscopic level. The why question is not really a scientific one. So I would suggest that, if we really don't understand causation in the first place, we shouldn't be using it in fundamental questions about the origin or the universe, or God, or the multiverse, or the nature of everything.
# posted by : 6:56 PM
: 6:56 PM
Just because some event is 100% correlated or happens before another event, doesn't mean it is a cause.
Sure. Hume thought our perception of cause and effect was just a psychological propensity of humans. We have only two ways of assigning cause and effect, consistent correlation and precedence of one event before the other, as indicated in Dr. Novella's post I linked to.
But I doubt Coyne or the other "New Atheists" would find the notion that our scientific theories do not represent actual cause and effect very palatable.
So I would suggest that, if we really don't understand causation in the first place, we shouldn't be using it in fundamental questions about the origin or the universe, or God, or the multiverse, or the nature of everything.
Well, the "nothing but effects" view is only one out of several and not priviledged in any significant way that I am aware of, except that it eliminates the first cause problem (more by fiat than anything else). If Coyne had raised it, I would have been less critical but I don't think it eliminates the first cause problem as a philosophical proposition.
Sure. Hume thought our perception of cause and effect was just a psychological propensity of humans. We have only two ways of assigning cause and effect, consistent correlation and precedence of one event before the other, as indicated in Dr. Novella's post I linked to.
But I doubt Coyne or the other "New Atheists" would find the notion that our scientific theories do not represent actual cause and effect very palatable.
So I would suggest that, if we really don't understand causation in the first place, we shouldn't be using it in fundamental questions about the origin or the universe, or God, or the multiverse, or the nature of everything.
Well, the "nothing but effects" view is only one out of several and not priviledged in any significant way that I am aware of, except that it eliminates the first cause problem (more by fiat than anything else). If Coyne had raised it, I would have been less critical but I don't think it eliminates the first cause problem as a philosophical proposition.
We have only two ways of assigning cause and effect, consistent correlation and precedence of one event before the other, as indicated in Dr. Novella's post I linked to.
But the philosophical problem then becomes: what is the difference between 100% correlation in time, and actual causation? What does it mean for something to "cause" something else? If you are defining causation in terms of correlation, then correlation is all that exists. There is nothing beyond correlation, no semantic difference between causation and 100% correlation. Most people (scientists included) don't understand that.
Well, the "nothing but effects" view is only one out of several and not priviledged in any significant way that I am aware of, except that it eliminates the first cause problem (more by fiat than anything else). If Coyne had raised it, I would have been less critical but I don't think it eliminates the first cause problem as a philosophical proposition.
I don't think it does either, but I think you need to be very specific (and very careful) in what you mean by "cause". That definition can be quite elusive.
But the philosophical problem then becomes: what is the difference between 100% correlation in time, and actual causation? What does it mean for something to "cause" something else? If you are defining causation in terms of correlation, then correlation is all that exists. There is nothing beyond correlation, no semantic difference between causation and 100% correlation. Most people (scientists included) don't understand that.
Well, the "nothing but effects" view is only one out of several and not priviledged in any significant way that I am aware of, except that it eliminates the first cause problem (more by fiat than anything else). If Coyne had raised it, I would have been less critical but I don't think it eliminates the first cause problem as a philosophical proposition.
I don't think it does either, but I think you need to be very specific (and very careful) in what you mean by "cause". That definition can be quite elusive.
# posted by : 9:04 PM
: 9:04 PM
If you are defining causation in terms of correlation, then correlation is all that exists. There is nothing beyond correlation, no semantic difference between causation and 100% correlation.
But we don't define it solely in terms of correlation. Hence the scientific aphorism that "correlation doesn't equal causation." It has to have more, primarily precedence, along with various fine-tunings of those criteria, such as some similarity in the purported cause and supposed effect (since I've been watching the Yanks game, if a pitcher won all his games in a year while wearing his "lucky" socks, we wouldn't take that correlation serious as a cause but would, instead, look to such things as the physical atheletic abilities of the pitcher, the quality of the batters he faced, etc.) and closeness in time and space of the purported cause and supposed effect. Furthermore, since there are some things that display correlation that still appear to be unrelated (virtually any event in the universe can be 100% correlated to lightning strikes somewhere on Earth on the same day) there does seem to be a difference between some correlations and others.
The problem is that there is no hard and fast rule of what counts as "similar" or "closeness".
I think you need to be very specific (and very careful) in what you mean by "cause". That definition can be quite elusive.
Certainly. But the first cause problem, as a conceptual argument, need not get involved in the minutia of how to identify any particular cause and effect relationship. It relies solely on the general proposition that cause and effect exists. While we may not be able to neatly nail down the concept, it certainly appears to us to be a feature of the world. In the absence of a strong reason to believe there is no such thing as cause and effect, the first cause problem is, at the very least, a viable philosophical proposition.
But we don't define it solely in terms of correlation. Hence the scientific aphorism that "correlation doesn't equal causation." It has to have more, primarily precedence, along with various fine-tunings of those criteria, such as some similarity in the purported cause and supposed effect (since I've been watching the Yanks game, if a pitcher won all his games in a year while wearing his "lucky" socks, we wouldn't take that correlation serious as a cause but would, instead, look to such things as the physical atheletic abilities of the pitcher, the quality of the batters he faced, etc.) and closeness in time and space of the purported cause and supposed effect. Furthermore, since there are some things that display correlation that still appear to be unrelated (virtually any event in the universe can be 100% correlated to lightning strikes somewhere on Earth on the same day) there does seem to be a difference between some correlations and others.
The problem is that there is no hard and fast rule of what counts as "similar" or "closeness".
I think you need to be very specific (and very careful) in what you mean by "cause". That definition can be quite elusive.
Certainly. But the first cause problem, as a conceptual argument, need not get involved in the minutia of how to identify any particular cause and effect relationship. It relies solely on the general proposition that cause and effect exists. While we may not be able to neatly nail down the concept, it certainly appears to us to be a feature of the world. In the absence of a strong reason to believe there is no such thing as cause and effect, the first cause problem is, at the very least, a viable philosophical proposition.
there does seem to be a difference between some correlations and others.
Yes of course, but can you identify your attributed "cause" with anything physical? Anything beyond just a human attribution based on what you perceive to be overwhelming correlation?
At a macro level, you have object A colliding with object B, so you attribute object B's new movement to an observed interaction with object A. That is the macroscopic "cause". But when you reduce, you get all kinds of electrostatic interactions, and they then become the "cause" - the macroscopic cause was an illusion. If you reduce still further, you get subatomic particles, carriers of force, and wavefunctions, that are correlated in the same way as object A and object B were at the macroscopic level. But where is the physical "cause"? The interaction is just a correlation. What is even meant by "cause", apart from what you perceive to be an overwhelming correlation between observed events? What is the physical difference between cause and correlation at a fundamental level?
Yes of course, but can you identify your attributed "cause" with anything physical? Anything beyond just a human attribution based on what you perceive to be overwhelming correlation?
At a macro level, you have object A colliding with object B, so you attribute object B's new movement to an observed interaction with object A. That is the macroscopic "cause". But when you reduce, you get all kinds of electrostatic interactions, and they then become the "cause" - the macroscopic cause was an illusion. If you reduce still further, you get subatomic particles, carriers of force, and wavefunctions, that are correlated in the same way as object A and object B were at the macroscopic level. But where is the physical "cause"? The interaction is just a correlation. What is even meant by "cause", apart from what you perceive to be an overwhelming correlation between observed events? What is the physical difference between cause and correlation at a fundamental level?
# posted by : 2:48 AM
: 2:48 AM
What is even meant by "cause", apart from what you perceive to be an overwhelming correlation between observed events? What is the physical difference between cause and correlation at a fundamental level?
I think we are now quibbling about semantics. We have certain "correlations" that are different than other "correlations" ... that are "true" correlations (or what ever description you want to use). The hallmarks of "true correlations," I suspect, involve similarity in the purported correlates, closeness in time and space and that they consistently occur in a certain order. Are we as likely to consider event A and event B to be "true correlations" if sometimes A happens first and sometimes B happens first, in no discernable pattern? Can you name a "true correlation" that does not have one of the events consistently occuring first?
I think we are now quibbling about semantics. We have certain "correlations" that are different than other "correlations" ... that are "true" correlations (or what ever description you want to use). The hallmarks of "true correlations," I suspect, involve similarity in the purported correlates, closeness in time and space and that they consistently occur in a certain order. Are we as likely to consider event A and event B to be "true correlations" if sometimes A happens first and sometimes B happens first, in no discernable pattern? Can you name a "true correlation" that does not have one of the events consistently occuring first?
Yes indeed, we are quibbling about semantics! But they are very deep and important semantics, with profound implications. You are defining "cause" as a specific type of close correlation in time, space, etc. And I'm saying fine, but then all causes still reduce to correlations at a fundamental level. There is no physical reason that makes event B happen after event A - it just does, 100% of the time. If that were not true, then block time could not even be under consideration as a viable model of time.
# posted by : 1:33 PM
: 1:33 PM
There is no physical reason that makes event B happen after event A - it just does, 100% of the time. If that were not true, then block time could not even be under consideration as a viable model of time.
Quite apart from how you can tell there is no cause to something happening 100% of the time in a certain order (how could you test that?), I'm not sure how this is supposed to help with the first cause problem. It seems to me that you are just substituting "100% correlation" for "cause and effect."
If you accept the anthropomorphic view of time, there is still the problem of what 100% correlated first by preceding the second event (and everything else).
Even if all time is simultaneous, unless time/space itself is the unmoved mover, there is still the question why there is something rather than nothing. Why space/time?
Quite apart from how you can tell there is no cause to something happening 100% of the time in a certain order (how could you test that?), I'm not sure how this is supposed to help with the first cause problem. It seems to me that you are just substituting "100% correlation" for "cause and effect."
If you accept the anthropomorphic view of time, there is still the problem of what 100% correlated first by preceding the second event (and everything else).
Even if all time is simultaneous, unless time/space itself is the unmoved mover, there is still the question why there is something rather than nothing. Why space/time?
As I have scanned over the dialogue, Professor Richard Lewontin's oft quoted "admission" comes to mind.
‘We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism.
It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is an absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door."
The issue is where do the facts lead, not what is our disposition toward their possible implications. The simple fact is that ex nihilo nihil fit, out of nothing, nothing comes. You can get into fine arguments about cause and effect and semantics but what, after all, do we know about the universe and how it works?
When we consider, for example, how much energy the sun has, a relatively small star, the amount of power is unimaginable. Someone has compared it to building an ice bridge that is one mile wide and two miles deep from the earth to the son. The energy from the sun could melt the entire bridge in a single second. When we consider that it is estimated that our galaxy contains 100-200 billion stars and the universe contains the same number of galaxies the question should arise where does all that energy or power come from? Are naturalistic causes a sufficient explanation to account for it?
Here I think the apostle Pual is helpful in determining the answer to that question.
"For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so that they are without excuse." Romans 1:20
An eternally powerful being with a divine nature is the only explanation for not only the amount of energy in the universe but the universe and the very nature of the universe itself and all it contains.
Defining science in such a way as to exclude the possibility of a divine cause is no more truth seeking then defining God without the possibility of the existence of science.
The issue is what does the accumulation of the data tell us, where does it lead? It is not where do we want it to lead and what do we want it to tell us.
The idea of a spontaneous universe is absurd in the extreme and a multi-verse theory even more so. The very best explanation we have is that, "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth."
‘We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism.
It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is an absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door."
The issue is where do the facts lead, not what is our disposition toward their possible implications. The simple fact is that ex nihilo nihil fit, out of nothing, nothing comes. You can get into fine arguments about cause and effect and semantics but what, after all, do we know about the universe and how it works?
When we consider, for example, how much energy the sun has, a relatively small star, the amount of power is unimaginable. Someone has compared it to building an ice bridge that is one mile wide and two miles deep from the earth to the son. The energy from the sun could melt the entire bridge in a single second. When we consider that it is estimated that our galaxy contains 100-200 billion stars and the universe contains the same number of galaxies the question should arise where does all that energy or power come from? Are naturalistic causes a sufficient explanation to account for it?
Here I think the apostle Pual is helpful in determining the answer to that question.
"For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so that they are without excuse." Romans 1:20
An eternally powerful being with a divine nature is the only explanation for not only the amount of energy in the universe but the universe and the very nature of the universe itself and all it contains.
Defining science in such a way as to exclude the possibility of a divine cause is no more truth seeking then defining God without the possibility of the existence of science.
The issue is what does the accumulation of the data tell us, where does it lead? It is not where do we want it to lead and what do we want it to tell us.
The idea of a spontaneous universe is absurd in the extreme and a multi-verse theory even more so. The very best explanation we have is that, "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth."
Professor Richard Lewontin's oft quoted "admission" comes to mind.
I can't imagine why one scientist's (to my mind) confused statement of his personal philosophy which is, in turn, what is really 'methodological natualism, leads you to Genesis' misogynic, murderous and anal god. The unanswered question about why there is something rather than nothing is no better answered by made-up "revelation" than it is by dismissing the problem all together.
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I can't imagine why one scientist's (to my mind) confused statement of his personal philosophy which is, in turn, what is really 'methodological natualism, leads you to Genesis' misogynic, murderous and anal god. The unanswered question about why there is something rather than nothing is no better answered by made-up "revelation" than it is by dismissing the problem all together.
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