Thursday, September 24, 2009
There's Bullocks In Philosophy, Too!
Nick Smyth has posted an article at 3 Quarks Daily, entitled "Science, Pseudoscience and Bollocks," that John Wilkins calls "infuriating but thought-provoking." I confess that I find it mostly confusing. Smyth wants to replace any talk about a demarcation between science and non-science/pseudoscience with a demarcation between "truth" and "bollocks."According to Smyth, the current way of opposing creationism is deficient.
[M]any of us will continue to oppose religious/mystical/creationist "cranks" in the name of Science. One of our main lines of attack will be territorial: we will accuse them of being on the wrong side. Science is over here, we will say, and you are over there, and we all know what that means.
The most interesting thing about this manoeuvre is that almost no-one performing it—scientist, philosopher, or otherwise—will be in possession of a single defensible definition of "science". In other words, they won't know what they're talking about.
In place of any such attempt, Smyth proposes:
Want to keep creationism out of schools? Point out that we shouldn't teach bollocks in schools, and that constitutional freedom of religion cannot imply that false things should be taught as if they were true things. Want to keep government funding away from creationists? Point out that the government shouldn't fund bollocks. I could go on, but Reisch, Pennock and others seem to think that once we abandon formal demarcation we are left with "no difference" between molecular biology and talking snakes. This is clearly absurd.
The only rational and intellectually honest thing to do is to forget about demarcation and to give authority to powerful, accurate and consistent explanatory programmes. In other words, we must recover the original sense of "science" as a diverse, evolving set of human activities that are only important because they produce systematic knowledge. Otherwise, that clever creationist is going to come along one day and point out that a central pillar of our rejection of his doctrines—the concept of "pseudoscience"—is bollocks.
But to take on Smyth's arguments on his own terms, his dismissal of demarcation commits, I think, the error of assuming that, because we cannot know exact boundaries of any particular category, we cannot know what we are talking about.
Day and night imperceptibly merge into each other at dusk and dawn, but can we not tell night from day tolerably well despite the existence of twilight? Science, like most human activities, is a sorites heap. There are many of them. What is the exact dividing line between democracy and tyranny? Should we then stop talking about them and speak only of government and "bullocks government"? Must we decide that molehills are indistinguishable from mountains? In science, what is the definition of "species" that does not exclude too much, or include too much? (A shameless plug for Wilkins' new book.) What is the "bright line" between "variety" and "species"?
To say that, because there is no bright line definition to precisely separate one category from another, we cannot speak intelligibly about those categories would reduce us almost to complete inarticulateness.
The real question here is how precise our definition has to be to serve the purpose we want to fulfill and, of course, what our purpose is. Since Smyth himself raises the question of how we keep creationism (or other religious content) out of public school science classes, I'll concentrate on that, especially as it plays out in the United States, under its particular (if not peculiar) constitutional scheme. (Smyth is a Canadian and may not have understood that context but, if so, what justification does he have to pronounce on what Judge Jones wrote?)
First of all, I don't see how Smyth's alternative helps us at all in terms of keeping creationism out of public school science classes. His "solution" is as follows:
We can go back 150 years and recover our epistemological focus. We will discover that truth is what matters, and that all we need to say about creationism, astrology and the like is that they are extremely bad truth-tracking programmes. They are, in a word, bollocks.
Someone once famously asked "What is truth?" How are we, philosophically or legally, to answer that question? And what is the "proper" epistemology? Creationists, such as Answers in Genesis, have their own answer:
The 66 books of the Bible are the written Word of God. The Bible is divinely inspired and inerrant throughout. Its assertions are factually true in all the original autographs. It is the supreme authority in everything it teaches. Its authority is not limited to spiritual, religious, or redemptive themes but includes its assertions in such fields as history and science. ...
By definition, no apparent, perceived or claimed evidence in any field, including history and chronology, can be valid if it contradicts the scriptural record. Of primary importance is the fact that evidence is always subject to interpretation by fallible people who do not possess all information.
According to their epistemology, it is evolution that is "bullocks." And in a democracy, why shouldn't their definition of bullocks prevail if they are, as they are in many places in this country and around the world, in the majority?
The problem, then, has just been pushed back one step by Smyth. Instead of deciding what is science and what is non-science/pseudoscience, now we are required to decide which epistemology best produces "truth," a category even less capable of a bright line definition than "science."
Smyth seems to recognize this in the comments:
You're right that the ultimate success of the strategy I advocate depends on the establishment of some epistemological ground rules. Indeed, I have been whinging--annoyingly--about this on 3QD for years now: science requires philosophy, and this is one of the (many) reasons why.
Yet, I think this particular post is better read as an address to you, I, or any other "scientifically-minded" person. Do you believe that creationism is pseudoscience? If yes, then tell me what science actually is. Hey, it turns out you can't. Alternately, do you believe that creationism is false? Well, clearly you do. So, why not specify the grounds on which you think it is false?
But the issue before the court in Kitzmiller was not whether creationism is false -- which Smyth certainly must have known because the very sentence before the part of Judge Jones' decision that Smyth quoted is:
After a searching review of the record and applicable caselaw, we find that while ID arguments may be true, a proposition on which the Court takes no position, ID is not science.
The question Judge Jones was answering was more limited than the one Smyth wants to address: 'is ID sufficiently like science as it is presently practiced that its roots in and support for religion must be ignored in determining whether it violates the First Amendment separation of church and state?' Government teaching of science is a legitimate "secular purpose," even if the science contradicts some religious tenet. But the reverse is true as well and, if some scientific result supported a religious tenet or contradicted an atheist position, the state could legitimately teach that as science.
Thus Judge Jones was, by the nature of the case (not to mention the arguments of the parties), required to determine whether or not ID was within the parameters of science as presently practiced.
Ironically, the way that courts go about this task -- which they also do in deciding whether a person who claims to be an "expert" in science can testify to his/her "opinion" rather than be limited to testifying about "facts" as every other witness is -- has to do with the epistemology the "expert" uses and whether or not other "scientifically-minded" people (i.e. scientists) accept the "expert's" methods as within present-day scientific practice, even if they disagree with the conclusions the "expert" reaches.
In other words, the law applies the very criteria Smyth is groping for. And in what way is Smyth's proposal not a demarcation criteria, since it is the same as what Judge Jones ultimately applied?
This is long enough, so I'll close here. But I may come back to address other things I think Smyth got seriously wrong.
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Labels: Smyth's Bollocks
I think you might appreciate anthropologist Greg Downey's Sympathy for Creationists. His post isn't so much sympathy (he acknowledges that as an Australian he doesn't have to worry about this debate having any real impact on what his kids learn in school) as recognition of the emic perspectives--on both sides--as a good anthropologist would.
In this context, demarcation is not a philosophical exercise (though philosophy should play a part), it is a sorting out of those various rights in a rational way. Simply trying to "burst through" the complications and declare one position to be the one and only true one is not only undemocratic but is irrational as well.
Worst of all, it is dangerous. Nothing has been a greater marker of tyranny than the declaration that one person or one priviledged group has the right to determine what is "true." If we say that is the measure of what "science" is, there is nothing to prevent creationists or any other politically powerful segment of society from enforcing its version of truth under the guise of "science." The demarcation program, while not perfect (what is?), is a rational and defensible way of protecting the practice of science from the tryanny of the majority.
I'll try and address your arguments in order, forgive me if I miss something!
I've shown--in this comment on The Panda's Thumb article--why the move to "only define pseudoscience" is illegitimate.
You say that I do not appreciate the "fuzziness" of certain concepts, and in a sense I totally agree with you that our use of the term "science" is imprecise, evolving and difficult to pin down.
Now, I said in my original post that it's totally fine to talk about science in this manner, as a loosely related evolving set of research programmes. But it is not OK to turn around and deny someone else (i.e. the creationist) social and political power because they're "pseudo" or "non" scientific. THIS person (rightly) demands an explanation as to why they are not scientific, and every attempt at a full explanation will fail precisely because of this "fuzziness". That is why this tactic is dangerous: it attempts to use a fuzzy, impossible-to-nail-down concept to draw strict lines. Lines that cannot be drawn.
Your main point is a skeptical one:
How are we, philosophically or legally, to answer that question? And what is the "proper" epistemology?
This is a very interesting move. In effect, you are suggesting that we will never be able to talk about truth, evidence and theory with creationists, because they are so epistemologically isolated from us that no amount of argument or evidence will ever change their minds. This is, I have to say, a terrifyingly pessimistic conclusion.
But does it matter? No. What matters is that we use broad, reasonable principles as a society in order to sort out truths and falsehoods. Principles like "a theory should not contradict itself", and "an empirical theory should conform to empirical evidence". These are solid, broadly accepted, easily defensible principles that we all use in our everyday lives. These are (some of) the principles that weed bollocks out.
See? Philosophy helps! I'm not claiming to have a full epistemology to throw back at you, indeed, a construction of such a system is the very project I'm advocating.
Finally, I am aware that the judge was being asked to define "science", and I used the definition as an example of how bad definitions usually are. I am also aware that such criteria as the blatantly circular "accepted by the scientific community" are used by courts. But I do not think that courts should be trying to answer these unanswerable questions, and I do not think that we should put any stock in the strikingly poor criteria that courts use, no matter how widely they use them.
I've shown--in this comment on The Panda's Thumb article--why the move to "only define pseudoscience" is illegitimate.
I don't think you have. Richard's response that you are raising a semantic quibble about "pseudo" is well taken, which is why I used the term "non-science" as an equivalent.
You say that I do not appreciate the "fuzziness" of certain concepts, and in a sense I totally agree with you that our use of the term "science" is imprecise, evolving and difficult to pin down.
If we cannot say what "non-science" is, even in "broad, reasonable" terms, in the same way you want to specify epistemology , then we can't do it for "science" either.
Now, I said in my original post that it's totally fine to talk about science in this manner, as a loosely related evolving set of research programmes.
We are not talking about what science may evolve into in the future, we are talking about a definition of "science" as it is (and/or should be) practiced today, all versions of which share "broad, reasonable principles" of epistemological practice such as you are appealing to ... and which were, as I pointed out, what Judge Jones applied. For example, his statement that "ID's negative attacks on evolution have been refuted by the scientific community" is simply another way of saying (as you put it below) "an empirical theory should conform to empirical evidence" (and, when empiric evidence contradicts your theory, continuing to maintain it in the face of that evidence is not proper epistemological practice). "Science" as it is practiced today is characterized by its shared application of broad, reasonable principles of epistemological practice (which would be the only reason we value it). In which case, you are simply semantically substituting "broad, reasonable principles of epistemological practice" for the term "science" and we are back into the demarcation problem of what distinguishes "broad, reasonable principles of epistemological practice" from epistemological practice that aren't broadly reasonable.
But it is not OK to turn around and deny someone else (i.e. the creationist) social and political power because they're "pseudo" or "non" scientific. THIS person (rightly) demands an explanation as to why they are not scientific, and every attempt at a full explanation will fail precisely because of this "fuzziness". That is why this tactic is dangerous: it attempts to use a fuzzy, impossible-to-nail-down concept to draw strict lines. Lines that cannot be drawn.
"Broad, reasonable principles of epistemological practice" is every bit as fuzzy, with lines equally impossible to draw.
Your main point is a skeptical one:
How are we, philosophically or legally, to answer that question? And what is the "proper" epistemology?
This is a very interesting move. In effect, you are suggesting that we will never be able to talk about truth, evidence and theory with creationists, because they are so epistemologically isolated from us that no amount of argument or evidence will ever change their minds. This is, I have to say, a terrifyingly pessimistic conclusion.
No more pessimistic than the conclusion that we can't draw "broad, reasonable" lines around what is science and what isn't and get creationists to agree ... which is the basis for your wanting to jettison the science/non-science distinction. If we can do one, we should be able to do the other. I've been following the creationist attack on science for going on three decades and we're no closer to changing creationists' minds about the "epistemological practice" of science than we ever were. I agree it is terrifying but playing semantic games won't bring us any closer. We're playing for the hearts and minds of the uncommitted. Leading people off into unfamiliar territory of "epistemological practice" when we already have a shorthand for that ("science") that most people recognize and have respect for, is a bad move that is also unnecessary. Adding what most Americans would consider an insulting term to the mix is even worse. There is a strong streak of anti-intellectualism in the US (already frequently played on by creationists -- ever hear them talk about "intellectual elites"?) and having governments, academics and courts calling peoples' beliefs "bullocks" ain't gonna help.
But does it matter? No. What matters is that we use broad, reasonable principles as a society in order to sort out truths and falsehoods. Principles like "a theory should not contradict itself", and "an empirical theory should conform to empirical evidence". These are solid, broadly accepted, easily defensible principles that we all use in our everyday lives. These are (some of) the principles that weed bollocks out.
Which of these solid, broadly accepted, easily defensible principles aren't used by "science"?
See? Philosophy helps!
If it is good philosophy. ;-)
I'm not claiming to have a full epistemology to throw back at you, indeed, a construction of such a system is the very project I'm advocating.
May I suggest that you start with the shared epistemological practice of science?
Finally, I am aware that the judge was being asked to define "science", and I used the definition as an example of how bad definitions usually are. I am also aware that such criteria as the blatantly circular "accepted by the scientific community" are used by courts. But I do not think that courts should be trying to answer these unanswerable questions, and I do not think that we should put any stock in the strikingly poor criteria that courts use, no matter how widely they use them.
"Accepted by the scientific community" means "applying the epistemological practice of science." What you've failed to do is show that there is any difference between science's epistemological practice and whatever it is that you are talking about.
I will say, however, that your equation of epistemology with science is totally unwarranted, and I urge you to look into this matter. Five minutes of research will reveal that "science" and "epistemology" are not the same thing. Most scientific research programmes (generally speaking) appear to adopt a certain epistemological framework, one which is not criticized or defended (how could it be? that's not the scientist's job, she is just supposed to forge ahead using the tools of her discipline).
Epistemology is the study of various alternative frameworks, how they work, how they can be defended, etc. Equating the two commits the ages-old fallacy of scientism: assuming that science is prior to epistemology, that it defines the limits of that discipline.
Finally, I repeat that your skepticism about epistemology is not wise. It amounts to saying that we cannot say what "truth" is at all. This is relativism! In effect, you undermine the entire discipline of science by denying it the right to claim truth-status over other fields. If you look into it, you will find that there are clear-cut, widely accepted logical rules that are not "fuzzy" and which can help us do epistemology correctly. Rules like the principle of non-contradiction (do not contradict yourself) and the principle of validity (the premises of an argument should guarantee its conclusion, or at least make the conclusion more probable). Epistemological principles are not "unfamiliar", they are what all of us use all the time in our daily lives.
Of course they are not the same thing. The question is what is the difference between this "something" you are talking about and the practice of the physical sciences. If science, as it is practiced today, applies all of these solid, broadly accepted, easily defensible principles you are talking about, then what is the point of distinguishing them from science? Nor does it matter if scientists think about epistemology. Since what we are talking about is how science is practiced, as opposed to how "pseudoscience" is practiced, a post hoc determination of the differences in practice is sufficient.
It amounts to saying that we cannot say what "truth" is at all. This is relativism! In effect, you undermine the entire discipline of science by denying it the right to claim truth-status over other fields.
Excuse me? If we cannot define what science is relative to other fields (including non-science) how can we talk about its truth-content? According to you, there is no "there" there to assess the truth of. In point of fact, I am not skeptical at all about science's truth content, I'm merely pointing out the consequences of your skepticism about knowing what science is and what separates it from those other truth claims.
Furthermore, just who is this "we" you are talking about? Why would creationists accept epistemology that refutes their claims if they won't accept science that refute them? It's no accident that a post-modernist (post-structuralist or whatever you want to call them) like Fuller was called as an expert for the defense in the Kitzmiller case. Creationists have adopted post-modernism (though never completely or consistently) on a regular basis of late.
Like it or not, in a democratic society there is no mechanism to force people to accept even broad, reasonable principles of epistemological practice. If a majority chooses not to accept such premises, they don't have to. As I already noted, "science" has the advantage of already having widespread respect and (more or less) acceptance while mostly you'll get blank stares if you start talking about epistemology. Unless there is a significant difference between the epistemological practices of science and what you are advocating, why should we give up that advantage?
The truth content of science comes from the fact that it applies the kind of epistemological standards you are talking about. When I said that "'Broad, reasonable principles of epistemological practice' is every bit as fuzzy, with lines equally impossible to draw as science itself", I was saying that they are equally fuzzy and difficult to define, and you gain no advantage by appealing to one instead of the other ... unless you can show where science does not apply such epistemological principles, in which case, why should we expect science to have more truth content than any other fields that ignore such principles?
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