Saturday, October 24, 2009

 

Philosophy and Philosophers


I had started on a fairly long response to Russell Blackford's reply to Massimo Pigliucci's blog post "On the scope of skeptical inquiry." But much of it has been overtaken by Russell's comments here. Specifically:

As for the claim about the age of the Earth, the ultimate answer I want to give is that rational inquiry rejects 6000 years as the correct age and settles on 4 to 5 billion years. It really doesn't matter whether that is characterised as a philosophical claim or a scientific claim. The reasons for settling on that answer are available, in principle, to anyone who is engaged in rational inquiry. But even if we say that it is ultimately a philosophical claim, it is a claim that philosophers make with the assistance of scientists.

The first alternative appears to argue that "rational inquiry" is coextensive with "science" ... if you do one, you are automatically doing the other. This seems to go with Russell's assertion that there are no simple and uncontroversial demarcations between science and other areas of human intellectual activity. I have to disagree. Science has one consistent marker: an insistence on testability through empiric evidence. It is not exclusive to science but if something is not empirically testable we can say it is not "science." What we call "philosophy" has no such requirement ... though, as Pigliucci pointed out, philosophy can, and almost undoubtably should, be informed by science, which does track with Russell's second alternative.

That does not, however, make philosophy identical to science. We can philosophically (and rationally) inquire about the nature and abilities of a god given any alleged premises about that god, without being able to empirically test them. This is why I disagree with Russell that it can be said to be scientific to "deduce what kinds of events would contradict" an "all-benevolent, all-powerful, all-knowing God" and then look to see if the empiric evidence contradicts such a being, as a scientific exercise. The problem, as I said in response to Jerry Coyne's piece, is what empiric standard are humans going to apply to what "benevolence" should look like from the perspective of a non-human, all-benevolent, all-powerful, all-knowing God? While the hunt for empiric evidence is within the warrant of science, determining what evidence would contradict such a being is not. It takes a philosopher for that (assuming it can be done at all). In short, I think Russell is unnecessarily smudging the difference between "science" and "everything else."

Similarly, I can't agree with Russell's contention that Omphalos is ruled out by science. It is quite true that a scientist can and should reject it (as science) because it is an ad hoc attempt to avoid empiric testability of the claim. (Let's set aside the issue that such ad hoc "rescues" are fairly common in "science".) But that rejection is not because of the operation of the scientific method but because of the philosophy that underlies the adoption of the scientific method. It is the same sort of difference as between determining whether a person's actions have violated a law and whether the law should ever have been enacted in the first place. A person cannot rationally do something that violates the agreed-to method of science and still call his or her activity "science," but he or she can certainly rationally (even if wrongly) argue that the method of science is not correct or not guaranteed to deliver "truth" in any particular situation given certain premises, such as "revelation trumps empiricism."

It is not at all clear to me that Russell's formulation would permit us to say the Intelligent Design Creationism is not "science." It is certainly "rational," in the sense that it takes a fact of the world -- "apparent design" -- and, in concert with at least one other premise -- that "materialism" is not "true" -- makes an argument that rationally follows from those premises. But if we have to equate it with "science" because it is "rational inquiry" (assuming that Russell is not equating "rational inquiry" with "what Russell thinks") then there seems to me to be something radically wrong with Russell's view of what science is.

There is more to be said but that's enough MEGO for one post.
.

Comments:
"Let me qualify that: there may be some claims that should be conceded as lying outside of science. "

I always comeback to the idea of evidence as it's understood in criminal trials. We could debate rationality, but I'm thinking of the difference between forensic (or scientific) evidence and circumstantial evidence such as eyewitness testimony.
I don't believe you can count circumstantial evidence as scientific, although it can be gathered using scientific methods. And I think we've come a long way (OJ case not included) in appreciating scientific evidence over circumstantial evidence.
But in the absence of scientific evidence, circumstantial evidence has and will continue to be considered rationally by courts and juries - sometimes in matters of life and death.
In that light, there are a lot of claims that lie outside the realm of science, simply because empirical evidence can't be found.
 
Umm, TB, forensic evidence is circumstantial evidence. Eyewitness accounts are usually considered direct evidence.

Paul, when you say "what empiric standard are humans going to apply to what "benevolence" should look like from the perspective of a non-human, all-benevolent,..." if we don't mean 'our' definition of "benevolent" the why are we using the term. We might as well say the being is 'all-foo' and know just as much about the being. Excluding the purported being from our definitions of "benevolent", "knowing", and "powerful" is, IMO, a pure 'god-of-the-gaps' argument.

When has science ever claimed a guarantee to deliver 'truth'?
[I do like "fairy common" as a link to ad-hoc rescues. (B-)]

I'm not clear on Russel's arument, but doesn't a rejection of 'materialism' automatically remove an argument from science?
 
Woops! True - for eyewitness accounts of an actual incident that's direct evidence. I was thinking of eyewitness accounts of everything except the actual crime. I've sat in on two murder cases recently where witnesses testified about events directly before and/or after a killing but no one saw the actual event, and there was no forensic evidence placing the accused at the scene. Yet the circumstantial evidence in the form of witness testimony of events directly before and/or after the events played important roles in convicting.
Forensic evidence, while in the realm of circumstantial (I knew that - sorry for not being clear), is what I consider emperical (a fingerprint on a gun) or scientific.
There are life and death decisions being made all the time with forensic, or scientific, evidence being absent. It's not the optimal situation, but they are examples of circumstances where action has to be taken without the benefit of emperical, scientific evidence based on claims that, by their very nature, are outside the realm of science.
Again, my fault for not being clear. Sorry!
 
... if we don't mean 'our' definition of "benevolent" the why are we using the term

There are ways that this world could be a result of benevolence. There is no way of determining whether or not it is.

But we do know that a benevolent universe does not include my speeling well.
 
With apologies to Wittgenstein, what would the world look like if it looked like God didn't put those fossils in those rocks to test our faith?

Alternately--Don Cates--what would the world look like if it looked like a world made by a benevolent all-caring god?

What is the meaningful contrafactual that really nails home the naturalist case?
 
Sorry TB, it's still not clear to me. ISTM that all evidence, direct and circumstantial, is to be treated in the same way by the judge/jury; how well does it support the claimed inferences. This is exactly what science does/is supposed to do.

"But we do know that a benevolent universe does not include my speeling well." How do we know that? (B-) An uncharitable (and humour impaired) person could claim this means you do believe we live in a benevolent universe.

I don't see how the 'benevolence' link you gave answers my argument. In vaccinating a child we can point to or at least hypothesize a long term benefit that is benevolent in our terms. There are many 'evils' in our world (and why restrict it to humans?) that I strongly suspect demands that one fall back on the 'God works in mysterious ways' or 'God's benevolence is beyond our understanding' argument to try and justify.

While the argument from the existence of evil is not iron clad (no argument is) I believe it justifies my inference that a particular class of gods (one that is widely claimed) does not exist. Similarly, I believe evidence and arguments from that evidence justifies my rejection of many other formulations of god(s). Those formulations I have seen that I cannot reject on an evidentiary basis do not appear to be different from no god at all, so I ignore those.

Thus my, provisional, atheism.
My personal argument with the 'omni-god' is:
benevolent - wants what is best for me.
other omnis - knows (even if I don't) what would/would not convince me of its existence/disabuse me of my atheism.
does not provide whatever that is.

Therefore such a god either does not exist, justifying my atheism; or does exist and whats me to be an atheist.
Win/win for me!
 
Don:

I should just say I'm not arguing against atheism. My only point was that any claim that atheism is "scientific" because we can empirically determine if the universe is benevolent is wrong. Nonscientific arguments are sufficient to rationally arrive at atheism.

In vaccinating a child we can point to or at least hypothesize a long term benefit that is benevolent in our terms.

The problem is that we are in the position of that two year-old girl. There is no reason to think we would have the capability to even hypothesize what long-term benefit there may be.

Those formulations I have seen that I cannot reject on an evidentiary basis do not appear to be different from no god at all, so I ignore those.

Again, I'm not arguing against atheism but the problem I see with that is that there is an infinite set of possible "gods" and the formulations that humans come up with are finite. There is no human way I can see to separate those possible gods into such neat and limited categories.

But I do agree that any possible god is not particularly interested in our knowing he, she or it is there. That's why I'm an apathetic agnostic in the first place.

"But we do know that a benevolent universe does not include my speeling well." How do we know that? (B-) An uncharitable (and humour impaired) person could claim this means you do believe we live in a benevolent universe.

No, since I am here and don't spell well, we know that if this universe is benevolent, it does not require me to spell well in order to be benevolent. It could also mean that my 5th grade teacher was right and I was sent by an evil god to torment her.
 
John,

If a theist makes the claim that 'God works in mysterious ways' and they believe in god as a matter of faith and leave it at that, then I have no argument except that I do not have that faith. No scientific reasoning, just that we disagree about something for which there can be no evidence.
But in my experience they never 'leave it at that'. Claims are made that can be examined from a scientific viewpoint. While such examination cannot justify atheism in general, it can justify it with respect to that particular formulation of god. That there are an infinite number of possible god formulations doesn't matter. There are also an infinite number of possible physics formulations. Bt so what, science works by making the best inference from what we do know, acknowledging that it is almost certainly not completely right. And this has a history of working pretty well and I feel justified in using it to inform my ideas about god. So far my best inference is that there isn't one.

As for the two year old, is this a two year old who's vocabulary and understanding includes "benevolence"? If not, then your analogy doesn't stand, and if so, then mine does.

"No, since I am here and don't spell well, we know that if this universe is benevolent, it does not require me to spell well in order to be benevolent. "
Sorry, but your logic has failed you. There is no qualifying "if" in your original statement. so you are definitely claiming that 'a benevolent universe that requires you to spell well' does not exist. What is the only way you could possibly know such a thing for certain?
 
... science works by making the best inference from what we do know ...

You have to be careful with the inference to the best explanation. It can "support" many things, including ID.

... is this a two year old who's vocabulary and understanding includes "benevolence"?

But that's the point! We may know the word (having invented it) but do we know what it really means? The two year old probably knows "good" and "bad" but can she apply them properly to the vaccination in its larger context?

There is no qualifying "if" in your original statement ...

Um ... there was in Russell's (which was the context) ... he gave two possible alternatives benevolent/non-benevolent (not necessarily correct, BTW). I don't have to state an "if" when there are only two offered alternatives.
 
Don,

What you are not grappling with is that science can't validate itself. It stops at a certain threshold, at which point trust (or even "faith" if you will) in the scientific epistemology takes over. Just as we can't prove, with science, that we aren't brains in vats, and that our whole phenomenal, world is a theatrical illusion we also can't prove, with science, that God didn't falsify the fossil record to test our faith. There is no experiment that settle the matter, no new data that can be turned up, because the brain-in-vat or young-earth hypothesis has already rejected observational data as illusory.

This is Pigliucci's point. We can still apply reason, conditional logic, ethics--in short, philosophy--after this threshold is crossed, but that subset of activity we call science must be silent once skepticism is applied to the very concept of reliable data.
 
John,

You have to be careful with the inference to the best explanation. It can "support" many things, including ID.

If Meyers can produce a convincing argument that ID is the 'best inference' then so be it. [shrug] I will not be holding my breath.

But that's the point! We may know the word (having invented it) but do we know what it really means?

Huh? It's like any other word. It means whatever the population of people using it agree that it means. If you mean something else, get your own word! (Or try to change the usage within your group)

[Concerning a qualifying "if"]
Um ... there was in Russell's (which was the context)

Umm... OhhhKaaay. (somehow I was under the impression that the context was a humourous aside in response to my humourous aside concerning a typo. But, whatever)

Chris

Where do you get the idea that I think science can validate itself?
While I realize that there is no way to logically reject all (any?) of the non-perceivedreality possibilities out there, I do reject them for practical reasons. I live my life and make decisions based on the belief that perceived reality and actual reality are very closely related.
(Consider everything I say from here on to be within that belief.)
I notice that almost everyone I see also seem (sometimes even in spite of their stated beliefs) to also live their life that way. The few times I've seen an actual rejection of that belief (rather than having another belief layered on top) it has not ended well.
Science and its methods have a strong record of working. I feel this justifies me in using its results and methods to inform my beliefs outside the field of science. (YMMV on this point.) One being the existence of supernatural beings.

In the particular case in this thread I have non-scientific reasons for rejecting what I see as rather [innocent whistling] desperate ad-hoc arguments (what does 'benevolence' really mean) to rescue the 'problem of evil' with respect to multi-omni gods. I then feel justified in using science and its methods to clean up what's left.

Can science scientifically disprove the existence of god(s)? No. But I believe it is a strong and useful tool in informing my beliefs. Including my lack of belief in the existence of god(s).
 
It's like any other word. It means whatever the population of people using it agree that it means. If you mean something else, get your own word!

Then you're just saying that the word has no meaning that science can investigate. It is not a phenomena that science can determine, it is just a sociological investigation that is dependent solely on usage by some people (and not by other people). The issue for you is apparently not whether or not the universe is benevolent but whether it is benevolent in the sense you think it should be. I don't find that [innocently whistling] to be a very interesting question.

My comment was humorous but humor needs context too ... spelled out at times it seems.
 
John,

Who is asking/claiming that science investigate the meaning of benevolent. We take an agreed upon definition and observe (that's the science part) that apparent reality doesn't fit that definition. Therefor etc. If you don't like that definition of 'benevolent' give us another. Thyat exchange could be interesting.
But giving the equivalent of 'If an multi-omni god exists then everything we see happening is benevolent' isn't interesting at all.
 
Jerry Coyne, for one. He doesn't recognize that the "Therefor etc" is philosophy. He says it is science. Russell is unclear on the point, as I said. It was Pigliucci's point all along that that the science ends with the observation part.
 
Don: "Sorry TB, it's still not clear to me. ISTM that all evidence, direct and circumstantial, is to be treated in the same way by the judge/jury; how well does it support the claimed inferences. This is exactly what science does/is supposed to do."

In the sense that Russell says: "Pigliucci is unnecessarily limiting the kinds of arguments that are available to scientists." And the sense that I agree with John when he says "if something is not empirically testable we can say it is not "science."

Testimony is most certainly evidence, but not necessarily scientific in the way John defines it. We may be able to establish that a crime occurred, a witness may provide details connected to that crime without actually having witnessed the event. But those details may not be backed up by any forensic evidence, nor may they necessarily be contradicted by them.

It's evidence of a sort that from observation, but not necessarily recreatable in a lab (or courtroom). We may be able to test indirectly the reliability of the witness, but we know of studies that show how reliable witnesses are. And, what if there is competing testimony by people with equally unreliable and/or shady backgrounds?

Pigliucci isn't unnecessarily limiting science. Science by its nature is limited by the natural world. My point is you don't even need an example of a supernatural claim to show that rational inquiry does not necessarily coexist with science.

We can say we rationally examine evidence in court cases and make life and death decisions, but I strongly disagree with the idea that because we do so those proceedings or the evidence considered are scientific.

Quote John again: "The first alternative appears to argue that "rational inquiry" is coextensive with "science" ... if you do one, you are automatically doing the other. This seems to go with Russell's assertion that there are no simple and uncontroversial demarcations between science and other areas of human intellectual activity. I have to disagree. Science has one consistent marker: an insistence on testability through empiric evidence. It is not exclusive to science but if something is not empirically testable we can say it is not "science."

I strongly agree.
 
John,

Jerry Coyne, for one.

What? He claims science can inform us about the meaning of 'benevolent'? I find that hard to believe. Do you have a cite?

He doesn't recognize that the "Therefor etc" is philosophy.

[blink] Stating the logically derived inferences from observations isn't part of science? Why not?

Pigliucci's point all along that that the science ends with the observation part.

If that's what he claims then I strongly disagree. That puts science back into the 'stamp collecting' genre.

I'm going back to lurking. I find reading you and (mostly) agreeing a more profitable use of my time. (I am not a quick thinker or typer and this takes up a lot of time for me. I'm getting old; time is precious.)

Oh, one more thing.
My comment was humorous but humor needs context too ... spelled out at times it seems.

Let me quote myself from slightly upthread:
"An uncharitable (and humour impaired) person could claim this means you do believe we live in a benevolent universe."
Note "An uncharitable (and humour impaired) person could claim".
It appears that even spelling out the context doesn't always work.
 
What? He claims science can inform us about the meaning of 'benevolent'?

I thought you were aware of my previous post about it. You may have to read it closely, because he is all over the place, but that's what he is arguing.

Stating the logically derived inferences from observations isn't part of science? Why not?

Because the inferences aren't as to phenomena of the natural world but as to ideas of human beings. Once you enter that realm, then you have to deal with the ideas ... such as what a benevolent universe might look like. Simply saying it doesn't look like this person's or that person's idea of what benevolence might look like -- especially when many of those people acknowledge the unknowability of exactly what it would look like -- means you have to go outside science to argue why science and logic should be able to tell us. Anyway you slice it, your "logical inference" is not from the empiric evidence but from philosophical arguments as to what science and logic can tell us.

Note "An uncharitable (and humour impaired) person could claim".

I had no problem with that (or, really, any part of it). I was only responding to where you said "your logic has failed you." I don't think it did, as I thought of the objection before you raised it and (I think) correctly dismissed it. And you laid a little snide on me [innocent whistling] and you got it back but I took no offense.

I'm going back to lurking.

No problem. But don't think I haven't enjoyed it.
 
I live my life and make decisions based on the belief that perceived reality and actual reality are very closely related.

Which is one thing you have in common with a Young Earth Creationist. The data "fossils in rocks" needs a Darwinian explanation to indicate evolution. It needs a revelationary explanation to indicate creationism. Neither is given to us in a package deal with "perceived reality."

The philosophical commitment to fossils as a theistic forgery is enormously problematic for reasons we both well know. But this is not the same as saying it goes without saying that they are not a theistic forgery. We make a philosophical commitment in either case, and the science follows therefrom.

About benevolence and evil, you need to be very careful about making inferences from a utilitarian perspective. If it were that simple then the road to hell would not be paved with anything at all, let alone good intentions. Only from an infinite and omniscient perspective could any of us know what the full implications of an act are. "Never call a man happy until he is dead."

There is an emotional temptation to equate suffering with evil, but this is where utilitarian logic founders, equating what we want with what we ought to want. It's no simple matter to work that out, which is one of the reasons why religion has been so robust throughout the ages.
 
Post a Comment

<< Home

This page is powered by Blogger. Isn't yours?

. . . . .

Organizations

Links
How to Support Science Education
archives