Thoughts in a Haystack

I had meant to blog about this before but now John Wilkins, with his usual perspicacity, has done so already.

Anyway, a mini war against Michael Ruse has broken out over his article, "From a Curriculum Standpoint, Is Science Religion?" Mark Perakh, Jerry Coyne and Ophelia Benson have all disparaged Ruse for his suggestion that, when a prominent scientist, such as David Barash, says "anyone who claims to espouse both science and religion is being intellectually dishonest or else lazy, and is necessarily short-changing one perspective or the other," then you have to:

... ask yourself. If "God exists" is a religious claim (and it surely is), why then is "God does not exist" not a religious claim? And if Creationism implies God exists and cannot therefore be taught [under the US Constitution], why then should science which implies God does not exist be taught?

Jason Rosenhouse weighed in with a much more nuanced response. After noting that Barash "went overboard," Jason says:

When I read someone like Ken Miller, for example, I fail to see how he is shortchanging either science or religion. When he talks about evolution he sounds much like Richard Dawkins. When he talks about his faith it is clear that he is not describing some watered-down version of the real thing. Personally I don't think his religious beliefs are very plausible, but surely that's a matter of opinion. Disagreements should not automatically lead to charges of dishonesty.

Jason goes on to state, quite correctly from a constitutional perspective:

It is obvious that the standard cannot be that it is unconstitutional to teach anything that conflicts with anyone's religious beliefs. That would render public education impossible, since anyone could then form a religion of one to object to any particular bit of the curriculum.

But there is a subtle though, perhaps, I admit, ultimately unimportant distinction to be made here. It is quite true that the mere fact that scientific results overwhelmingly argue against, for example, a 6,000 year old Earth, does not prevent, under the US Constitution, our teaching the results of science about the age of the Earth.

Some scientists are not content with that, however.

Jerry Coyne, for example, wants to dub "science" as a "worldview" that cannot be held (consistently) with theism*, much as Barash does. Larry Moran thinks that science can go beyond merely reporting the facts of the world, which may, or may not, imply things about god(s) but, instead, can directly address the question of the existence of god(s).

Ruse's question was, of course, addressed to the latter sort of scientists. To be clear, Ruse's position, if deemed an argument, instead of a conditional, is a sort of argument from consequences and, therefore, a logical fallacy. On the other hand, it is also true that a majority of scientists, as Jason (and, recently, Coyne, apparently) hold, would reject the notion that "science" does any such thing. It is not a logical fallacy to engage in an reductio ad absurdum to show that the positions of others are faulty.

So, Ruse, taken at his word, is not asking if science can be taught if it has implications for the existence of particular god(s), but, whether, the implications some scientists draw about the results of science makes the scientific enterprise a philosophy/theology that cannot be taught as science.

Fortunately, the legal analysis of what is constitutional in this regard is neither as simplistic as Ruse'.s question nor the philosophy of those who prompted the question. A few scientists regarding science as a "worldview" is not enough for American courts to rule it as such. Naturally, that is not, as Jason notes, any guarantee as to what the courts will do in the future and Ruse is right to hope that scientists will learn more about philosophy.

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* In fairness, Coyne has recently exhibited a possible backing-away from that position.
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